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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
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Utah Corporation; JAMES C. Mc-
GARRY, JR.,; LINDA McGARRY; 
JAMES R. GLAVAS, dba J.G. REALTY; 
JAMES GLEASON; ROBERT G. ANDER-
SON; UNITED FARM AGENCY, INC., 
a Utah Corporation; CLAN 
STILSON; and DOES I through XV, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RODNEY L. PHILLIPS~ 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
JCM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, 
a Utah corporation; JAMES C. 
McGARRY, JR.; LINDA McGARRY; 
JAMES R. GLAVAS, d/b/a J. G. 
REALTY; JAMES GLEASON; ROBERT 
G. Al\JDRRSON; UNITED FARM 
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DOES I through XV, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
REPLY BRIEF ON APPEAL 
POINT I 
Case No. 18,211 
THERE -WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE INTRODUCED 
AT TRIAL TO BASE A VERDICT AGAINST THE 
DEFENDANT, UNITED FARM AGENCY, INC., A 
UTAH CORPORATION. . 
Plaintiff assumes, without any substantiation, that in 
the instant transaction, Robert Anderson was United Farm 
Agency's agent and that United Farm Agency was· Robert 
Anderson's principal. Plaintiff then proceeds to quote 
general principal-agent law, but in the context of the 
instant facts plaintiff fails. to establish, based_upon the 
record, either that United Farm Agency was actually Robert 
Anderson's principal or that an agency relationship of any type 
even existed. It is appellant's position that.the plaintiff must 
demonstrate facts which would establish the legal relationship 
between Anderson and United Farm Agency. The facts in this case 
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are simply inadequate to establish an independent contractor 
relationship let alone an employment relationship between 
Anderson and United Farm. Appellant set out in detail the 
elements that must be established to prove an employment rela-
tionship (Appellant's Brief pp. 13-17), and the respondent simply 
has failed to refute the fact that there is no evidence in the-
record to support the finding of employment and the imputation 
of liability from A.i.""1der.son to United Farm. Without alluding 
to the record, plaintiff reaches the unwarranted and unfounded 
conclusion that United Farm Agency is plaintiff's agent. Plaintiff 
reached this conclusion despite the fact that it's deal with 
. 
Anderson was not consUITu.~ated with United Farm Agency forms, was 
not closed w.ith Hr. Snow, United Farm Agency's attorney, was in 
contravention of United Farm Agency policies and Utah statutes, 
· and was done without the knowledge of United Farm Agency's broker 
or United Fann Agency. 
-Plaintiff knew at the time the Earnest Money Agreement 
in this action was signed, that it was not a United Farm 
Agency document. Neither United Farm Agency nor it's broker, 
Clan Stilson, were aware of nor involved with the closing. 
Plaintiff is attempting to establish that United Farm Agency ·-· 
was Anderson's principal in spite of the fact that the 
entire transaction that occurred on August 14, 1978, was in 
violation of United Farm Agency policies and practices as 
established and was for Anderson's sole benefit and interest. 
Defendant's Brief on Appeal makes it clear that United 
Farm Agency was not Robert Anderson's prlncipal with respect 
to the transaction in issue. Plaintiff, in his Brief of 
-2-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Respondent, has sho-vm nothing which would refute this fact. 
Plaintiff has alleged negligence on the part of United 
Farm Agency for its failure to supervise the activities and 
conduct of Anderson. The allegation stems from a section of 
United Farm Agencv's brief which plaintiff extracted and 
used completely out of context. (Brief on Appeal at 16). 
The statement by defendant :Ln his brief referred only to the 
instant transaction. The reason that no supervision existed 
was that United Farm Agency was unaware of Anderson's activities. 
Plaintiff relies on Wells v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 
590 P.2d 1251, 1254 (Utah 1979), to establish the fact that 
UFA knew or should have kno'i-m that Anderson was mishandling 
plaintiff's affairs. However, the language from ~ells upon 
which plaintiff in the instant case relies.is not the langu~ge 
··· of the Court, but rather, language from the complaint in Wells. 
A careful reading of Wells will reveal that the Court is not 
endorsing the notion, as plaintiff in the instant action has 
s·upposed, that a principal always knows or should know all 
activities and conduct of its agent. Rather, the Court is saying 
that if that were true in that specific case, .it would estab-
lish a basis for granting relief. Wells provide no authority, 
for the instant plaintiff's conclusion that, as a matter of law, 
United Farm Agency knew or should have known of Anderson's 
activities and conduct. 
Assuming, arguendo, that a principal-agent relationship 
existed in the instant case, the holding in Wells would dictate 
that United Farm Agency is not liable for the acts of Anderson. 
In discussing the liability.of a principal for the acts of an 
-3-
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agent or employee when those acts are committed without the 
principal's authority or knowledge, the Court in Wells held; 
It is, of course, to be recognized that if 
the employee is not so authorized and is 
acting for his own interest, and not in the 
furtherance of the employer's business, the 
'latter would not be bound by his acts. 
590 P.2d at 1264. 
In the instant case, it is clear that Anderson was not 
acting with the authority and knowledge of United Farm Agency. 
The alleged uclosingu was in contravention of United Farm Agency 
_policies, no ·attorney was used, the documents used were not 
United Farm Agency's, United Farm did not receive a commission 
and·no person from United Farm Agency ever -knew of or approved 
of. the. "deal .. " Therefore, on the authority of Wells., United Farm 
Agency would not be bound by or liable for the acts of Anderson • 
. It is respectfully submitted· that the decision imputing 
the conduct of Anderson to Clan Stilson and United Farm 
Agency, a Utah corporation, is without support in the record 
an...d should be reversed. The relationship between real 
estate salesman and broker is established by statute. 
Contravention of this statute as well as the established 
policies of the broker by the salesman should prevent any 
vicarious liability from arising with respect to such faulty 
transactions. 
POINT II 
AN INDIVIDUAL CANNOT MAINTAIN AN ACTION IN HIS 
OR HER NAME FOR WRONGS DONE BY THIRD PARTIES 
TO A CORPORATION WITH WHICH THE INDIVIDUAL 
IS ASSOCIATED. 
In respondent's brief, plaintiff seems to be laboring 
-4-
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~.,, 
under the misconception t·hat the plaintiff and Phillip's 
Construction Companv, Inc., are the same entity. While 
plaintiff ·admits that a corporation, Phillip's Construction 
Company, Inc., was formed in 1978, he states in his brief 
that "the plaintiff did business personally as .Phillip's 
Construction Company at all times." It is a contradiction 
i_n terms to say that nplaintiff did business personally at 
all times" while admitting that "business was intended to be 
carried on through the corporation." The only testimony in 
the record that relates to how the plaintiff conducted his busi-
ness is that elicited from the plaintiff, Rodney Phillips. 
Phillips testified that after the formation of the corpora-
tion, all of the business and business assets were owned by the 
corporation, with the exception of th_e equipment which allegedly 
was retained by Mr. Phillis (Tr. 132). 
It is crucial in this action that any damages suffered 
by plaintiff and any damages suffered by Phillip's Construction 
Company, Inc., be properly separated and recognized as 
distinct. Plaintiff was given, at the time of·the transaction, 
promissory notes totaling $79,000.00 which represented his 
equity in the business. However, the accounts receivable 
·and accounts payable in issue are matters which touch and 
concern the corporation, Phillip's.Cohstruction Company, 
Inc. Plaintiff admitted at trial that he was n·ever paid any 
of the obligations for which he is allegedly responsible on 
the corporation's behalf. He has, therefore, sustained no 
d~mages with respect to such obligations. As discussed in 
defendant's Brief on Appeal, the Court in Norman v. Murray 
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First Thrift & Loan Co. , 596 P. 2d 1023 (Utah 1979), ·emphasized 
. the.emnity that should exist between a shareholder and a 
corporation, such as plaintiff and Phillip's Construction 
Company, Inc., in the instant case. The Court in Norman 
held: 
[F]or· even though .a shareholder owns 
all, or practicallv all, of the stock f 
in a corporation such a fact does not 
authorize him to sue as an individual 
for a wrong done by a third party to 
the corporation. 
Plaintiff's damages, if any, should properly be limited 
to any losses which he mav have personally incurred .. It is, 
therefore, irrelevant with respect to plaintiff's plea for 
damages that he sees himself as obligated in some manner for 
debts which he has n_ever paid, and which are properly the 
debts of Phillip's Construction Company, Inc. The facts clearly 
show that the plaintiff did not prove that the corporation had 
been purs~ed or that any of the creditors had looked to him for 
payment •. Finally, Phillis has filed_bankruptcy and accordingly 
he cannot make a claim for debts he will never be obligated 
to pay. 
POINT III 
THAT PORTION OF THE JUDGMENT WHICH REFERS 
TO THE DEFENDANT'S OBLIGATION TO ASSUME 
CORPORATE LIABILITIES OF PHILLIP'S CON-
STRUCTION COMPANY IS VOID AS A MATTER OF 
LAW IN VIOLATION OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
Plaintiff has alleged in his brief that the defense of 
the Statute of Frauds is unavailable to United Farm Agency 
with respect to plaintiff's obligations which JCM Development 
·.Company was allegedly to have assumed and paid. Nowhere in 
-6-
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plaintiff's bri~f has he alleged that a signed agreement existed 
pursuan~ to which any one of the defendants would assume the 
obligations and debts of the plaintiff. Even the moderate 
amount of debt set out ih the Earnest Money Agreement was ex-
tinguished by the subsequent negotiation and execution of the 
warranty deed as explained in United Farm Agency's Brief on 
· Appeal. (Brief on Appeal at 30-31). The absence of such an 
agreement, signed by the party to be charged, definitely 
brings the matter under the statute of frauds. 
"',..' 
Plaintiff alleges t_hat the statute of frauds is unavailable 
to the defendant because it was not affirmatively pled. 
United Farm Agency did not _affirmatively plead the Statute of 
Frauds defense because plaintiff's obligations were not specifically 
delineC?-_ted as part of plaintiff's damages. Furthermore, it· 
was completely unclear whether the obligations were plaintiff's 
personal obligations, obligations of Phillip's Construction 
Company, Inc., etc. As pointed out in United Farm Agency's 
brief, plaintiff has waived his right to recover for the debts 
and obligations because they were not specifically stated as 
special damages. (Brief on Appeal at 32). 
It is respectfully submitted that the plaintiff has 
waived his right to claim the debts as damages or, in the 
alternative, any duty the defendants had to make an affirmative 
defense is obviated by the plaintiff's failure to specify 
the items of special damage which he contended he was entitled 
to recover. 
POINT IV 
-7-
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.THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD 
TO SUSTAIN A JUDGMENT AGAINST ROBERT ANDERSON 
FOR BREACH OF DUTIES OWED TO THE PLAINTIFF. 
Plaintiff has made several allegations in his brief 
that are.not in line with the facts. Plaintiff states that 
on August 14, 1978, Robert Anderson expressed no concern at 
the manner of the closing when he knew things were not being 
done as they should. In fact, Anderson testified that he 
did not know that the meeting o.f August 14, 1978, was a 
"closing. n Furthermore, plaintiff had .reserved in the 
listing agreement the right to sell the property himself and 
had in fact dealt directly with the other parties at times 
without Anderson. Because of the nature of the listing 
agreement, Anderson could not force himself upon plaintiff.· 
and require that he, Anderson, be the one to sell the 
prop~rty and handle the deal. And.erson advised plaintiff as 
to the impropriety of executing the deal as a stock transfer, 
but regardless of that advice, plaintiff chose to proceed as 
requested by the other parties. 
The trial court found that Anderson had a responsibility. 
to see that the closing was handled by an attorney. However, 
plaintiff dealt directly with Gleason who handled the closing-~ 
in a manner contrary to the ~dvice Anderson had given plaintiff. 
There~ore, Anderson should have no obli.gation to provide an 
attorney for a closing he was not handling and for a seller 
who he was no longer representing and who was. selling against 
his advice. 
Plaintiff has suggested that Anderson was aware or knew 
of JCM Development's financial incapacity. This is out of 
-8-
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line with the facts. Anderson was contemplating .making a 
sale of land to JCM. He would not have done so if he had 
the information plaintiff alleges he had. By making such 
suggestions, it would seem that plaintiff is attempting to 
exculpate his o-vm unwise decision to accep~ unsecured notes 
from parties with whom he had. dealt directly and of whom he 
knew nothing. 
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence is 
insufficient as a matter of law to impose liability upon 
Anderson and that the. legal test used by the Court in 
defining the standard of care to be imposed upon i\nderson. is 
improper. 
Respectfully submitted this ~day of September, 1982. 
~ .. ~~ RCHARD  *ofFSON or : 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PE~RSE-;-­
Attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent United Farm Agency 
MAILED two (2) copies of the foregoing Reply Brief on 
Appeal to Mr. Paul w. Mortensen, Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
P.O. Box 339, Moab, Utah 84532-0339; dated this d 3_ day of 
September, 1982. 
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